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C
ritics have long faulted the wide-spread practice of trade promotions as wasteful. It has been estimated
that this practice adds up to $100 billion worth of inventory to the distribution system. Yet, the practice
continues. In this paper, we propose a price discrimination model of trade promotions. We show that in a
distribution channel characterized by a dominant retailer, a manufacturer has incentives to price discriminate
between the dominant retailer and smaller independents. While offering all retailers the same pricing policy,
price discrimination can be implemented through trade promotions because they induce different inventory-
ordering behaviors on the part of retailers.
Differences in inventory holding costs have been shown to be an important determinant of consumer pro-
motions. Our analysis suggests that differences in holding costs are also potentially an important driver for the
use of trade promotions. The implications from our model explain a number of anecdotal and/or empirically
observed puzzles about how trade promotions are practiced. For example, our analysis explains why chain
stores welcome trade promotions but independents do not. Our analysis outlines implications for managing
trade promotions.
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1. Introduction
According to the most recent estimate, consumer
goods manufacturers in the United States spend about
$85 billion on trade promotions, amounting to 13% of
sales. In comparison, consumer promotions account
for 6%, and advertising and media spending only 4%
of sales (Cannondale Associates 2002). Although trade
promotions are widely used by manufacturers, they
are often seen as wasteful. For example, Buzzell et al.
(1990) argue that trade promotions impose severe
administrative burdens on manufacturers and add
huge inventory costs to distribution channels.1 Many
have asked the question: If trade promotions are inef-
ﬁcient, why are manufacturers still using them? A
number of explanations have been proposed in the
literature. It has been suggested that manufacturers
face a Prisoners Dilemma-like situation—they have
to offer trade promotions, otherwise the competition
will take business away from them (e.g., Drèze and
Bell 2003). Lal (1990) shows that national brand man-
ufacturers could use trade promotions to limit the
encroachment from a store brand. Lal et al. (1996)
suggest that allowing retailers to forward buy bene-
ﬁts competing manufacturers because forward buy-
1 According to one estimate, $75–$100 billion worth of inventory is
added into the U.S. distribution channel because of trade promo-
tions. See Kahn and McAlister (1997, p. 21).
ing decreases the intensity of competition between
manufacturers. Agrawal (1996) analyzes the role of
brand loyalty in determining optimal advertising pol-
icy (defensive strategy to build brand loyalty) and
trade promotion policy (offensive strategy to steal
customers from competition).
In this paper, we offer another explanation for
trade promotions. Our explanation essentially estab-
lishes the price discrimination role of trade promo-
tions in a channel context. Manufacturers can use trade
promotions to price discriminate between large retail-
ers (e.g., chains) and small retailers (e.g., indepen-
dents) by exploiting their different inventory carrying
costs. Blattberg et al. (1981) have shown that retailers
can take advantage of the differences in consumers’
inventory carrying costs. In this paper, we show that
manufacturers can similarly take advantage of the dif-
ferences in retailers’ inventory holding costs to achieve
price discrimination through trade promotions.
However, price discrimination in a channel con-
text is not a straightforward extension of that in a
nonchannel context, as multiple channel members are
now involved in pricing and inventory decisions.
More importantly, this price discrimination explana-
tion for trade promotions results in a number of inter-
esting predictions that are consistent with some of the
otherwise puzzling observations in the area of trade
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promotions. For example, the following predictions
from our analysis explain why:
(1) Manufacturers schedule their trade promotions
well ahead to make it possible for retailers to plan
forward buying.
(2) Trade promotions are observed for packaged
goods but not for perishable goods (Sellers 1992).
(3) Chain stores are happier with trade promotions
but independent and convenience stores are not.2
(4) Manufacturers allow forward buying but forbid
diverting.
(5) Manufacturers are complaining much more
about trade promotions in recent years.
We believe that our ability to explain all these
in the context of a parsimonious model suggests that
the model is potentially useful. More speciﬁcally, in
the context of a channel consisting of a single manufac-
turer and multiple retailers, we show that a manufac-
turer can effectively price discriminate among retailers
by offering trade promotions if retailers have different
inventory holding costs. The stores with lower holding
costs and higher warehouse capacity (usually domi-
nant retailers like chain stores and warehouse clubs)
can beneﬁt from forward buying. Interestingly, we fur-
ther show that not only does the retailer with low
holding costs beneﬁt from trade promotions, but the
retailer with high holding costs can also beneﬁt from
this practice. Indeed, social welfare can also increase.
Although we initially derive these results in a dom-
inant retailer channel setting (Samuelson and Nord-
haus 1989), we show in the Technical Appendix, which
can be found at http://mktsci.pubs.informs.org, that
these results hold in a more general competitive chan-
nel setting also.
To the extent that a manufacturer can use trade
promotions to price discriminate between retailers,
Jeuland and Narasimhan’s (1985) paper is closely
related to our study. However, our research differs
from theirs. In their model, the retailers are not mak-
ing pricing decisions.3 We explicitly model retail-
ers’ pricing decisions over time. Our model therefore
2 Independents and wholesalers who act as buying agents for inde-
pendents always complain that trade promotions are not a fair
practice for them (Zwiebach 1990, U.S. Distribution Journal 1992).
For example, “Not surprisingly, in a broad survey of wholesalers,
87 percent agreed that the most urgent issue facing the wholesale-
supplied system is fair and equal access to trade promotion funds”
(U.S. Distribution Journal 1993b). On the other hand, chain stores
beneﬁt more from trade promotions and are happy with trade pro-
motions (Progressive Grocer 2002, U.S. Distribution Journal 1993a).
For instance, “Results also noted in the study show that whole-
salers and their independent retail customers tend to beneﬁt less
from trade allowance programs than do other distribution chan-
nels” (U.S. Distribution Journal 1993a).
3 In Jeuland and Narasimhan (1985), a seller could price dis-
criminate between more intensely consuming and less intensely
consuming customers by offering temporary price cuts. To make
this section consistent with the rest of the paper, we are using
takes the Jeuland and Narasimhan’s (1985) analysis to
the next logical step. This generalization yields inter-
esting insights. One of these insights is that trade
promotions can alleviate the double marginalization
problem by giving the leading retailer more incen-
tives to charge a lower retail price.4  5 In addition, the
model allows us to make some testable predictions
about the practice of trade promotions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section describes the dominant retailer model.
The analysis in §3 consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part
outlines the benchmark case, where the manufacturer
is not allowed to offer trade promotions and ana-
lyzes the manufacturer’s incentives to price discrimi-
nate between a dominant retailer and the competitive
fringe. The second part derives the manufacturer’s
optimal trade promotion strategies and the retailers’
optimal pricing and inventory decisions. Section 4
derives a number of interesting predictions about
the effect of trade promotions on the manufacturer’s
proﬁts, retailers’ proﬁts, and social welfare. Section 5
relaxes some assumptions used in the model. We con-
clude with a summary in §6.
2. The Model
Consider a stylized channel where a manufacturer
is selling a product through a dominant retailer
(e.g., a chain store) and the competitive fringe (e.g.,
smaller independent retailers). The dominant retailer
sets the retail price (p), and the competitive fringe
takes the retail price as the market price (Samuel-
son and Nordhaus 1989).6 We start with the domi-
nant retailer model for three reasons. First, the phe-
nomenon of power retailers is a familiar scene in today’s
retailing landscape, and large retailers are becoming
“manufacturer” and “retailers” as in the rest of paper to represent
the “seller” and “customers” in Jeuland and Narasimhan (1985),
respectively. We thank anonymous Reviewer 3 for the suggestion.
4 Double marginalization problem refers to the situation where the
economic interests of upstream and downstream ﬁrms are not
aligned, such that the retail price facing end-users is too high to
maximize channel proﬁts, as illustrated in Jeuland and Shugan
(1983).
5 Bruce et al. (2005) show that manufacturers of more durable
products give deeper promotional discounts, which helps miti-
gate the double marginalization problem. One of the differences
between our research and theirs is that our research shows manu-
facturers can use trade promotions to alleviate double marginaliza-
tion through price discriminating between retailers. Their research
shows that manufacturers selling a more durable product offer a
greater depth of trade promotions and therefore have a less sever
double marginalization problem.
6 Formally, the competitive fringe supplies at the quantity where
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increasingly dominant in the marketplace.7  8 Second,
large chains often assume the role of price leader-
ship and exert pricing inﬂuence over smaller retailers
(Raju and Zhang 2005). Third, the dominant retailer
model simpliﬁes the expositions considerably. As we
show in the Technical Appendix, which can be found
at http://mktsci.pubs.informs.org, if we were to relax
the key assumption of only the dominant retailer set-
ting the retail price and introduce price competition,
our conclusions would not change qualitatively.9
The total market demand in each period is given by
Q = a − bp, where a>0 and b>0 are constants. The
dominant retailer faces a downward-sloping demand
function given by
Qd =a−b1p  (2.1)
The demand facing the competitive fringe in each
period is correspondingly,10
Qc =Q−Qd = b1 −b p  (2.2)
In this dominant retailer channel, the competitive
fringe’s demand is increasing in retail price p, while
the dominant retailer’s is decreasing in p such that
these two different types of retailers do compete with
each other. Figure 1 illustrates the demand functions
7 In the grocery industry, for example, mass merchandisers, ware-
house clubs, and chain stores account for 23% of total grocery sales
in 2002, while that number was only 9% in 1995 (Frank et al. 2003).
Furthermore, the number of grocery chain stores in the United
States was 18,400 in 1980, accounting for 52.7% of the total number
of grocery stores. By 2003, the number of chain stores has mush-
roomed to 21,560, accounting for 65.4% of the total number of gro-
cery stores. In the meantime, the share of dollar sales for chain
stores increases from about 60.2% to 82.7%. Not surprisingly, inde-
pendents shrank in number from 16,500 in 1980 to 11,421 in 2003
and their dollar sales percentage decreased from 39.8% to 17.3%
(Progressive Grocer Annual Report 1981, 2003).
8 There are several recent papers studying how the emergence of
dominant retailers affects the interactions between channel mem-
bers. In a bargaining model, Dukes et al. (2006) show that manufac-
turers may beneﬁt from the increase in retailer dominance because
channel efﬁciency can improve with dominant retailers gaining cost
advantages. Geylani et al. (2007) show that a manufacturer has
an incentive to engage in joint promotions and advertising with
weaker retailers, because the manufacturer gets a higher margin
with weaker retailers than with dominant retailers, who has the
power to dictate the wholesale price.
9 In some industries, small stores can form cooperatives, such as
buying clubs, to get promotional discounts from manufacturers
or can make purchases from a middle party like a wholesaler,
who buys from manufacturers for many small stores. The former
case can be analyzed using the competitive model in the Technical
Appendix, which can be found at http://mktsci.pubs.informs.org.
This paper is limited in analyzing the later case because we do not
model a wholesaler between the manufacturer and retailers.
10 It is worth noting that the competitive fringe in this paper is con-
sidered as a group of independents modeled as a single entity. Each
independent in the competitive fringe is weak in terms of mar-
ket power compared with the single dominant retailer. We thank
anonymous Reviewer 3 for suggesting that we make this point
clear.
Figure 1 Retailers’ Demands for b<b 1 ≤1 5b
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Q d = a–b 1 p
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=
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0
at the retail level. We assume b<b 1 ≤ 3b/2i no u r
analysis to avoid any corner solution.
In this channel, all retailers incur a holding cost for
any inventory carried from one period to the next.
In practice, chain stores and warehouse clubs usu-
ally have lower inventory costs than independents.
One reason could be a lower cost of capital. Further-
more, chain stores and warehouse clubs also have
higher inventory holding capacity and much more
shelf space than independents, a big component of
inventory holding costs, especially for food retailers
(Blattberg et al. 1981). Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume a lower inventory holding cost for the dom-
inant retailer.11 We assume that the dominant retailer
has a ﬁnite unit holding cost (0≤h1 < ) and retailers
in the competitive fringe have an inﬁnite unit hold-
ing cost (h2 = ). It is important to note that the inﬁ-
nite inventory holding cost for a competitive fringe
is only a simplifying assumption, and we relax the
assumption in the Technical Appendix, which can be
found at http://mktsci.pubs.informs.org, where we
allow a ﬁnite difference in the inventory holding costs
between the dominant retailer and retailers from the
competitive fringe. As the manufacturer’s production
costs do not affect our substantive conclusions, we set
them equal to zero for simplicity.
2.1. Manufacturer’s Decision Variables
The manufacturer in our model announces a whole-
sale price wi for each period i within a pricing cycle
11 Furthermore, in Appendix A we also show that the dominant
retailer has more incentives than retailers in the competitive fringe
to reduce unit holding cost rate, because the economic reward from
a unit of reduction in holding cost rate is higher for the dominant
retailer who makes forward buying than for the competitive fringe.
Therefore, the dominant retailer will have a lower unit holding cost
than the competitive fringe in the long run, which further validates
our assumption.Cui, Raju, and Zhang: A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
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Figure 2 Timing of Decisions in Dominant Retailer Channel
Manufacturer decides:
the length of pricing
cycle and wholesale
prices for each period
over the cycle
Dominant retailer and
the competitive fringe
decide:
how much to purchase
from the manufacturer
Dominant retailer sets
the retail price
Competitive fringe
meets the residual
demand
consisting of N periods (i =1     N).12 The length of
the pricing cycle N is also a manufacturer decision
variable. The manufacturer’s objective is to maximize
the average proﬁt per period within a pricing cycle.13
2.2. Dominant Retailer’s Decision Variables
Conditional on the manufacturer’s decisions on the
length of a pricing cycle (N) and the wholesale prices
in each period within the cycle (w1 w 2     w N), the
dominant retailer sets the retail price pi for periods
i =1 2     N to maximize its total proﬁt in each pric-
ing cycle. As the dominant retailer has a ﬁnite holding
cost, some inventory may be carried from one period
to the next if forward buying is proﬁtable. Therefore,
the dominant retailer also makes decisions on Q
i j
d ,
the inventory the dominant retailer orders in period i
and sells in period j, where i, j ∈ 1     N and i ≤j.
2.3. Competitive Fringe’s Decision Variables
Retailers in the competitive fringe take pi as the mar-
ket price in each period i. As the holding cost for these
retailers is assumed to be inﬁnite, they do not carry
any inventory from one period to the next. Therefore,
a retailer in the competitive fringe will buy the prod-
uct from the manufacturer and sell to customers if
wi ≤pi in period i.
Mathematically, the manufacturer solves the follow-
ing optimization problem:
max
w1 w2     wN N
  N
i=1wi
  N
j=i Q
i j
d +Qi i
c
 
N
 
 
where Q
i j
d denotes the inventory the dominant
retailer orders in period i and sells in period j, and
Qi i
c denotes the inventory the retailers in the com-
petitive fringe order and sell in period i. Of course,
we have Q
i j
c = 0 for any i  = j, because a competitive
fringe does not carry any inventory. Given the man-
ufacturer’s wholesale prices and the length of pric-
ing cycle (w1 w 2     w N N), the dominant retailer’s
optimization is given by
max
p1 p2     pN Q
i j
d
  N  
j=1
j  
i=1
 p
j −wi −h1 i−1  Q
i j
d
 
 
12 In this paper, we are modeling off-invoice trade promotions.
13 For an early proof for the equivalence between maximizing aver-
age proﬁt per period and maximizing total proﬁt as discount factor
approaches zero (see Jewell 1963).
We summarize the timing of decisions in this channel
in Figure 2.
The model speciﬁed above can result in a num-
ber of different pricing outcomes. Figure 3 illustrates
several possible optimal wholesale price schedules.
We deﬁne trade promotions as temporary price dis-
counts offered by the manufacturer to retailers. There-
fore, all the schedules except Figure 3(a) could be
viewed as trade promotion schedules. For instance, in
Figure 3(b), w1 is the discounted wholesale price and
w2 is the regular wholesale price. If the manufacturer
offers a low price in one period and charges higher
and increasing prices for the following two periods, as
in 3(d), then w1 and w2 are both promotional whole-
sale prices, and w3 is the regular wholesale price.
3. Analysis
We ﬁrst show why the manufacturer has an incentive
to price discriminate. We analyze the manufacturer’s
and the dominant retailer’s pricing decisions, assum-
ing that the manufacturer charges a time-invariant
single wholesale price to all retailers. This case of no
trade promotions is our benchmark for comparison
with the case where the manufacturer offers trade
promotions to the retailers. We will show that under
some conditions, trade promotions can increase the
manufacturer’s proﬁts as well as channel proﬁts, even
Figure 3 Examples of Optimal Wholesale Price Schedules
Time
(periods)
Time
(periods)
Time
(periods)
Time
(periods)
Wholesale price
Wholesale price Wholesale price
Wholesale price
11 ...
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
w1
w1
w2
w2
w2
w1
w3
w3 w3
w4 …
w1
w2
One pricing cycle
Wholesale price
4 3 22
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after accounting for the additional inventory costs
that are added into the channel as a consequence of
forward buying by the dominant retailer.
3.1. Manufacturer’s Incentives to Price
Discriminate Between Retailers
If the manufacturer does not offer trade promotions,
i.e., that the wholesale price is constant over time,
all retailers will order from the manufacturer in each
period, and none will carry any inventory from one
period to the next. The optimal prices and proﬁts
are easy to determine, and we simply state these in
Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. If the manufacturer is restricted to offer-
ing a common time-invariant wholesale price to retailers,
then the manufacturer will set its wholesale price at ws =
a 2b1 −b /2bb1 and the dominant retailer sets its retail
price at ps = a 2b1 +b /4bb1. The manufacturer’s average
sales and proﬁt per period are given by Qs =a 2b1 −b /4b1
and  s =a2 2b1 −b 2/8bb2
1, respectively.
Proof of Lemma 1. Please see Appendix B.14
Of course, a single wholesale price is suboptimal
for the manufacturer for two reasons. First, the com-
petitive fringe is passive in setting the retail price in
the channel, and it will meet the residual demand
as long as the wholesale price it has to pay is less
or equal to the retail price set by the dominant
retailer. Thus, ideally, the manufacturer wants to be
able to charge the competitive fringe a higher whole-
sale price equal to the retail price, so as to take away
all the proﬁts from the competitive fringe. Second,
the manufacturer must also be mindful of the dou-
ble marginalization problem dissipating channel prof-
its because of too high a retail price. Because only
the dominant retailer’s marginal cost will determine
the retail price, if possible, the manufacturer ide-
ally wants to charge a lower wholesale price only to
the dominant retailer. Therefore, to alleviate the dou-
ble marginalization problem and to take advantage
of the price-following behavior in the channel, it is
in the manufacturer’s interest to price discriminate
between the dominant retailer and the competitive
fringe. However, charging different wholesale prices
to different retailers who are competing in the same
market is unlawful. The manufacturer must ﬁnd some
other mechanisms to reap the beneﬁts of price dis-
crimination. Trade promotions, or time-variant whole-
sale prices, is one such pricing mechanism.
3.2. Trade Promotions as a Mechanism to
Price Discriminate
When the manufacturer offers trade promotions, it
offers the same wholesale prices to all retailers. Thus,
nominally, the manufacturer does not price discrim-
14 Unless stated otherwise, proofs for lemmas and propositions are
provided in the appendix.
inate. However, as inventory holding costs differ
among retailers, not all retailers can take advantage
of trade promotions to the same degree. The retailers
in the competitive fringe do not carry any inventory
from one period to the next, because their holding
cost is assumed to be inﬁnite (relaxed later). The
dominant retailer ﬁnds it desirable to carry inventory
acquired at the promotional wholesale price to those
periods with higher wholesale prices, i.e., to forward
buy, if its unit holding cost (0≤h1 < ) is low enough.
Because it is more proﬁtable to buy in promotional
periods and carry inventory forward, the effective
wholesale prices are lower for the dominant retailer
than for the competitive fringe. Thus, trade promo-
tions enable the manufacturer to price discriminate.
In Lemma 2, we formalize this intuition, stating the
manufacturer’s and retailers’ optimal strategies when
trade promotions are offered in the channel.
Lemma 2. If the dominant retailer has a positive unit
holding cost (0<h 1 < ), while the competitive fringe has
an inﬁnite unit holding cost (h2 =  ), then the manufac-
turer will offer the lowest wholesale price in the ﬁrst period
and charge an increasing wholesale price in each of the
following N −1 periods within any N-period pricing cycle.
The promotional wholesale price w1 in the ﬁrst period, the
wholesale prices wi in the ith period (2≤i ≤N), the retail
price pj (1≤j ≤N), dominant retailer’s sales Qdj in the jth
period, competitive fringe’s sales Qcj in the jth period, aver-
age sales per period Qh1, and the manufacturer’s average
proﬁt per period  h1 are, respectively, given by

                               
                               
w1 =
N 4ab1 −2ab −b1bh1 N −1  
2b1 b N +1 +b1 N −1  
wi =
a+b1w1 +b1h1 i−1 
2b1
i =2     N
pj =
a+b1w1 +b1h1 j −1 
2b1
j =1     N
Qdj =
a−b1w1 −b1h1 j −1 
2
j =1     N
Qcj =
 b1 −b  a+b1w1 +b1h1 j −1  
2b1
j =1     N
Qh1 =
1
4b1
 4ab1 −2ab −2bb1w1 −bb1h1 N −1  
 h1 =
1
N
 
w1
N  
j=1
Qdj +
N  
i=1
wiQci
 
 
(3.1)
and we also have

 
 
wi =p
i i =2     N
p
i −p
i−1 =
h1
2
i =2     N 
(3.2)Cui, Raju, and Zhang: A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
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Figure 4 Optimal Wholesale and Retail Prices Within a Pricing Cycle
for N =5
Time
(periods) 12345 …
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
One pricing cycle
Price
Retail price
Wholesale price
Figure 4 shows the manufacturer’s and the re-
tailer’s optimal prices within a pricing cycle when
N is equal to 5. The retail price will be raised by
h1/2 per period because the dominant retailer’s effec-
tive unit acquisition cost increases at the rate of h1
per period.15 The manufacturer also raises the whole-
sale price by the same amount to take the surplus
away from the competitive fringe. Thus, at any off-
promotion period, the dominant retailer prefers to
lower its price in the current period to sell more,
instead of carrying any inventory forward to the next
period. The manufacturer charges a wholesale price
equal to the retail price in period i (i = 2     N)t o
get all surplus from the competitive fringe. To deter-
mine the length of pricing cycle N, the manufacturer
solves the following optimization problem:
max
N
 h1 N 
s.t. w1 + i−1 h1 ≤wi i =1     N
w1 =
N 4ab1 −2ab −b1bh1 N −1  
2b1 b N +1 +b1 N −1  
wi =
a+b1w1 +b1h1 i−1 
2b1
 i =2     N
N ≥1  (3.3)
The constraints w1 +  i − 1 h1 ≤ wi guarantee that
the dominant retailer’s effective unit acquisition cost
of the items sold in period i = 2     N is no higher
than the wholesale price in the same period, so that
the dominant retailer does not ﬁnd it worthwhile to
purchase from the manufacturer in period i at the cur-
rent wholesale price. As the dominant retailer’s effec-
tive acquisition cost per unit is increasing at a faster
15 As we show in extensions, it is not necessary for wholesale prices
to increase every period for the manufacturer to price discriminate
between retailers. Two price points are sufﬁcient for price discrim-
ination to occur and allow the manufacturer to capture the bulk of
the beneﬁts from trade promotions.
rate (h1 per period) than the wholesale price (h1/2
per period) over time, there is an upper limit for N
beyond which it is not proﬁtable for the dominant
retailer to carry any inventory. The constraints thus
provide an upper bound on the manufacturer’s deci-
sion variable N. As the range for N is convex and
compact, there always exists a solution to the opti-
mization problem (3.3). Given the optimal N and the
sequence of wholesale prices preannounced by the
manufacturer, retailers will not carry any inventory
from one pricing cycle to the next, because the ﬁrst
period in the next pricing cycle will be a promotional
period again. The manufacturer’s decisions on N and
the sequence of wholesale prices in a pricing cycle
will therefore not depend on its decisions in any other
pricing cycles. In Appendix C, we show that the man-
ufacturer’s announcement of both the length of pric-
ing cycles N and the sequence of wholesale prices is
credible. The manufacturer has no incentive in any
period within a pricing cycle to deviate from the pre-
announced N and wholesale prices.16 This suggests
that both the manufacturer’s and retailers’ behaviors
are independent between pricing cycles.
It follows from the analysis above that the effec-
tive unit acquisition cost for the dominant retailer is
lower than that for the competitive fringe in period
i = 2     N,o rw1 + h1 i − 1 <w i for i = 2     N.
This leads to our ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1. The manufacturer can use trade pro-
motions to price discriminate between retailers who have
different inventory holding costs.
Proposition 1 formally suggests a new justiﬁcation
for trade promotions not previously recognized in the
literature. While offering the same wholesale price to
all retailers but varying it over time, the manufacturer
can price discriminate between retailers who are com-
peting in the same market, as long as the retailer(s)
with high wholesale price sensitivity has lower unit
inventory holding costs than the retailer(s) with low
wholesale price sensitivity. Because of the ability to
price discriminate, the manufacturer can proﬁt from
trade promotions. This perhaps explains the paradoxi-
cal trend, as noted by Ailawadi et al. (1999, p. 84), that
“at the peak of the trade promotion controversy, man-
ufacturers’ proﬁts increased at a fairly steady rate,
whereas retailers’ proﬁts were stable at best.”
Our analysis also sheds some light on why man-
ufacturers typically allow forward buying, but vehe-
mently oppose any diversion. Our analysis suggests
that forward buying makes price discrimination
16 We thank the Area Editor and anonymous Reviewers 1 and 4 for
pointing out this to us. In practice, the manufacturer can also cred-
ibly commit to a sequence of prices because of reputation factors,
legal factors, etc.Cui, Raju, and Zhang: A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
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possible, but diversion weakens the price discrimina-
tion mechanism. Furthermore, Proposition 1 suggests
that trade promotions could also alleviate the dou-
ble marginalization problem. Therefore, the channel
as a whole could beneﬁt from such a practice because
the manufacturer can induce the dominant retailer
to set a lower retail price by charging the dominant
retailer with a lower wholesale price—a lower retail
price increases channel proﬁts in a dyadic channel
where the linear wholesale price contract is in use.
Indeed, such beneﬁts can be substantial, as we will
show through numerical analyses in the next section.
4. Effects of Trade Promotions
A preliminary examination of the value of the price
discrimination explanation for trade promotions can
be made based on its ability to explain how trade
promotions are practiced. To this end, we conducted
numerical analyses to show the possible effects of trade
promotions on players’ proﬁts and social welfare. The
results from the numerical analyses are limited in
their generalizability but sufﬁcient to motivate poten-
tial explanations for: (1) why trade promotions are
frequently observed for packaged goods but rarely
observed for perishable goods; (2) why chain stores
are happy with trade promotions but independent
and convenience stores are not; and (3) why manu-
facturers started complaining about the effectiveness
of trade promotions as retailers became larger.
Table 1 lists the parameters used in the numerical
study. We discuss our ﬁndings in detail in the follow-
ing subsections.
4.1. Manufacturer’s Incentives to Offer
Trade Promotions
Intuitively, all else being equal, the manufacturer will
be more willing to offer trade promotions to retailers
as a price discrimination mechanism if the dominant
retailer has a lower unit holding cost. Furthermore,
the incidence of trade promotions also depends on
the size of the dominant retailer. All else being equal,
if b1 is smaller (b1 closes to b), the manufacturer has
less of an incentive to offer trade promotions because
the dominant retailer is selling a bigger proportion
of the total demand. The beneﬁts from inducing the
dominant retailer to charge a lower retail price will
Table 1 Values of Parameters in Numerical Analyses
Parameters Values
a 1
b 1
h1 0.0005, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08,
0.09, 0.10, 0.11, 0.12
h2 + 
b1 1.00, 1.05, 1.10, 1.15, 1.20, 1.25, 1.30, 1.35, 1.40, 1.45, 1.50
not offset the cost. If b1 is larger (b1 closes to 3b/2),
the manufacturer also has less of an incentive to offer
trade promotions. This is because a larger b1 gives
the dominant retailer the incentive to charge a lower
retail price, as a large b1 implies a high consumer price
sensitivity. Only for the intermediate values of b1, the
manufacturer will be willing to use trade promotions
to price discriminate between the dominant retailer
and the retailers in the competitive fringe. Figure 5
and Result 1 conﬁrm these intuitions.
Result 1. Trade promotions can be proﬁtable to the
manufacturer when the dominant retailer’s unit hold-
ing cost h1 is sufﬁciently low at any given b1.A t
any given h1, the manufacturer has incentives to offer
trade promotions when the dominant retailer is sufﬁ-
ciently dominant but not overly dominant (b1 is of an
intermediate value).
Result 1 suggests that trade promotions are not
always beneﬁcial to the manufacturer. Only in those
channel settings where the dominant retailer is not
too dominant, or inventory holding costs vary sufﬁ-
ciently among retailers, are trade promotions beneﬁ-
cial to the manufacturer. This suggests that one is less
likely to observe trade promotions in product cate-
gories, such as produce and frozen foods, where the
holding costs for these products are quite high and
similar for both chain stores and independents. The
easy-to-store items such as canned food or detergents,
however, are expected to have more shipments on
trade promotions.
Result 1 also suggests that the presence of a very
dominant retailer (very low b1) in a distribution chan-
nel is not conducive to the functioning of trade pro-
motions as a price discrimination mechanism. At any
given inventory holding cost h1, the more dominant
the dominant retailer is in a channel, the less likely
the manufacturer will resort to trade promotions.
This suggests that one is less likely to observe trade
promotions in product categories, such as toys and
ofﬁce supplies, where power retailers signiﬁcantly
dominate.
Figure 5 Manufacturer’s Promotion Boundary
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Table 2 Increase in Sales Under Multiple-Wholesale-Price Strategy Relative to Single-Wholesale-Price Strategy (%)
Holding cost h1 (%)
b1 0.0005 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
1.00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.05 1 97 1 11 0 67 0 27 −0 21 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.10 4 12 2 89 2 19 1 33 1 03 0 56 0 09 −0 38 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.15 6 21 4 71 3 93 2 91 1 98 1 78 1 32 0 86 0 41 −0 05 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.20 8 23 6 51 5 57 4 43 3 52 2 97 2 52 2 07 1 62 1 17 0 72 0 27 0 00 0 00
1.25 10 17 8 31 7 27 5 86 5 00 4 10 3 68 3 24 2 79 2 35 1 91 1 47 1 03 0 00
1.30 12 04 10 02 8 85 7 43 6 43 5 55 4 80 4 37 3 93 3 50 3 07 2 63 2 20 0 00
1.35 13 84 11 70 10 49 8 94 7 82 6 94 6 06 5 47 5 04 4 61 4 18 3 76 3 33 0 00
1.40 15 56 13 30 12 06 10 41 9 16 8 29 7 42 6 55 6 12 5 70 5 27 4 85 0 00 0 00
1.45 17 22 14 89 13 58 11 82 10 51 9 59 8 73 7 59 7 17 6 75 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.50 18 82 16 41 15 04 13 17 11 88 10 86 10 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
4.2. Effects of Trade Promotions on Sales
A lower h1 can facilitate price discrimination through
trade promotions. Sales are therefore expected to
increase with a smaller h1. When the dominant retailer
has a smaller b1 or equivalently a larger demand
share, the manufacturer will have a lower incentive to
offer trade promotions. When b1 is small, the double
marginalization problem is worse, and sales do not
increase as much.
Table 2 shows the percentage increase in the manu-
facturer’s sales by using multiple wholesale prices as
opposed to the sales by using single wholesale price,
i.e.,  Qh1 −Qs /Qs × 100%, where Qs = a 2b1 −b /4b1
as shown in Lemma 1. This leads to the result below.
Result 2. Increase in average sales per period can
decrease in the dominant retailer’s holding cost h1
given b1, and is increasing in the dominant retailer’s
price-sensitivity parameter b1 given h1.
Result 2 and Table 2 suggest that when the man-
ufacturer uses trade promotions to price discriminate
between retailers, its sales can increase because of the
reduced retail price, and such an increase is larger
for a smaller h1 and/or a larger b1. As shown in
Accenture (2001), 95% of the interviewed manufactur-
ers cite “Increase Store Sales” as the top reason for
trade promotions.17 Result 2 and Table 2 provide a
potential rationale for such an almost unanimous cita-
tion from manufacturers about the reasons for trade
promotions.
4.3. Effects of Trade Promotions on Proﬁts
As a lower h1 facilitates price discrimination through
trade promotions, the manufacturer’s proﬁts are
expected to increase with a smaller h1.18 When the
17 The ACNielsen Report on Trade Promotion Practices (2004) shows a
similar result: the top three reasons for manufacturers to run trade
promotions are “increase sales volume,” “increase market share,”
and “maintain current volume” that together account for 83% of
responses.
18 Our numerical study shows that N is decreasing in h1 and
increasing in b1.
dominant retailer has a larger demand share (a
smaller b1), the proﬁtability of trade promotions for
the manufacturer is decreasing, as there is less surplus
the manufacturer could take from the competitive
fringe through price discrimination. Table 3 shows the
percentage increase in the manufacturer’s proﬁt by
using multiple wholesale prices as opposed to a sin-
gle wholesale price, i.e.,   h1 − s / s ×100%, where
 s = a2 2b1 −b 2/8bb2
1 as shown in Lemma 1. This
leads to the result below.
Result 3. The increased proﬁts from trade pro-
motions as opposed to a single wholesale price for
the manufacturer are decreasing in the dominant
retailer’s holding cost h1, and has an inverted-U rela-
tionship with the dominant retailer’s price-sensitivity
parameter b1.
Result 3 provides a potential rationale for the vocal
complaints in recent years by the manufacturers about
the effectiveness of trade promotions. As dominant
retailers such as chain stores and warehouse clubs
become larger (small b1), the beneﬁts of trade promo-
tions to the manufacturer decrease. It is such a change
that prompts some manufacturers to reevaluate the
effectiveness of their trade promotions. From this per-
spective, it is easy to see why practitioners recognize
that “success (of trade promotions) will be elusive
unless independents are involved” and as far as the
effectiveness of trade promotions is concerned, man-
ufacturers “need a strong, viable independent sector”
(Progressive Grocer Annual Report 2000, p. 30).
We can also examine how retailers’ proﬁtability is
affected by the same parameters h1 and b1. We sum-
marize our results below.
Result 4. The beneﬁts from trade promotions for
the dominant retailer can decrease in its holding
cost h1 and have an inverted-U relationship with b1.
The competitive fringe retailers can become either
worse off or better off because of trade promotions.
Their gain from trade promotions can increase with h1
and can have a U-shaped relationship with b1.Cui, Raju, and Zhang: A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
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Table 3 Increase in the Manufacturer’s Proﬁt Under Multiple-Wholesale-Price Strategy Relative to Single-Wholesale-Price Strategy (%)
Holding cost h1 (%)
b1 0.0005 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
1.00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.05 4 87 3 09 2 18 1 20 0 35 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.10 8 00 5 82 4 63 3 14 2 31 1 59 0 87 0 16 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.15 9 63 7 36 6 11 4 56 3 34 2 72 2 10 1 48 0 87 0 27 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.20 10 21 7 99 6 77 5 17 4 11 3 21 2 67 2 13 1 60 1 08 0 56 0 05 0 00 0 00
1.25 10 07 7 97 6 81 5 30 4 28 3 39 2 78 2 31 1 85 1 39 0 94 0 50 0 06 0 00
1.30 9 43 7 49 6 41 5 02 4 04 3 26 2 57 2 16 1 76 1 36 0 97 0 58 0 21 0 00
1.35 8 45 6 68 5 70 4 43 3 51 2 83 2 18 1 78 1 42 1 07 0 73 0 40 0 07 0 00
1.40 7 23 5 64 4 76 3 61 2 77 2 19 1 63 1 22 0 91 0 61 0 31 0 02 0 00 0 00
1.45 5 86 4 45 3 66 2 63 1 90 1 38 0 90 0 55 0 27 0 01 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.50 4 38 3 14 2 44 1 54 0 92 0 47 0 06 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
Intuitively, as the holding cost h1 is a direct cost
to the dominant retailer, a higher h1 will reduce the
dominant retailer’s proﬁt. Our analysis shows that
the increase in the dominant retailer’s proﬁts has
the highest value for the intermediate values of b1
(Figure 6 in the Technical Appendix, which can be
found at http://mktsci.pubs.informs.org, veriﬁes this
result). The intuition for this is as follows. The domi-
nant retailer’s proﬁts are affected by two factors. One
is the average proﬁt from each unit sold, and the
other is the total number of units sold. When b1 is
large (close to 3b/2), the manufacturer offers a higher
promotional depth relative to the single-wholesale-
price strategy (see Table 4) and the increase in the
dominant retailer’s average proﬁt from each sale as
opposed to the single-wholesale-price strategy gets
higher. However, for any p, its demand share is small
for a large b1. The effect of a small demand share dom-
inates the effect of a high average proﬁt from each
sale; therefore, the dominant retailer’s proﬁt is low for
a large b1. When b1 is small (close to b), the dominant
retailer has a large portion of demand, but the average
proﬁt from each sale is small because the manufac-
turer offers a higher w1. Thus, the dominant retailer’s
proﬁts will again be small. Therefore, the dominant
Table 4 Promotional Depth Under Multiple-Wholesale-Price Strategy Relative to Single-Wholesale-Price Strategy (%)
Holding cost h1 (%)
b1 0.0005 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
1.00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.05 2 50 2 54 2 58 2 18 2 65 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.10 4 81 4 73 4 94 5 00 3 78 4 23 4 67 5 12 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.15 7 01 6 92 6 58 6 45 7 29 5 32 5 75 6 17 6 60 7 03 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.20 9 09 9 08 8 99 7 86 8 66 6 39 6 80 7 21 7 62 8 03 8 44 8 84 0 00 0 00
1.25 11 09 10 81 10 61 10 86 10 00 10 77 7 84 8 24 8 63 9 02 9 41 9 80 10 20 0 00
1.30 13 01 12 86 12 92 12 30 11 31 12 05 8 87 9 24 9 62 10 00 10 38 10 76 11 13 0 00
1.35 14 83 14 48 14 46 13 71 12 58 13 29 14 00 10 24 10 60 10 97 11 33 11 70 12 06 0 00
1.40 16 57 16 42 15 95 15 07 13 82 14 51 15 20 11 21 11 57 11 92 12 27 12 63 0 00 0 00
1.45 18 25 17 94 17 40 16 40 17 38 15 70 16 36 12 17 12 51 12 86 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.50 19 83 19 41 18 79 19 17 18 63 16 86 17 50 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
retailer’s proﬁt is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing
with b1.
The numerical study also suggests that the pricing
cycle will be shorter (N is smaller) for a higher h1.
Because the ﬁrst period within a pricing cycle is the
only period during which the retailers in the compet-
itive fringe can make a proﬁt, they will have higher
average proﬁts with shorter pricing cycles, implying
that the competitive fringe’s proﬁt increases in h1.
The competitive fringe gets the lowest proﬁt for
intermediate values of b1 and more proﬁts for smaller
and larger b1’s as expected. Also note that for a
large b1 and a large h1, the competitive fringe could
become better off because of trade promotions. For a
given b1, it is optimal for the manufacturer to choose a
shorter pricing cycle when h1 goes up. Thus, the pro-
motional period 1, when the competitive fringe can
get positive surplus, will occur more frequently as h1
becomes larger and the competitive fringe becomes
better off as a result. For a given h1, the manufacturer
will offer a lower w1 but will choose a longer pric-
ing cycle when b1 becomes larger. When b1 is very
large, the positive effect of a lower w1 on the compet-
itive fringe’s proﬁts will dominate the negative effect
of a longer pricing cycle, and the competitive fringeCui, Raju, and Zhang: A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
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becomes better off. Therefore, the competitive fringe’s
proﬁt is ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing in b1.
4.4. Effects of Trade Promotions on Social Welfare
Many researchers have argued that trade promo-
tions are harmful to a channel because of increased
inventory holding costs. Although our model also
suggests that trade promotions increase inventory
holding costs, we ﬁnd that trade promotions can
potentially beneﬁt the system as a whole by enabling
the manufacturer to price discriminate between retail-
ers. We state this result formally below (Figure 7
in Technical Appendix TB, which can be found at
http://mktsci.pubs.informs.org, veriﬁes this result).
Result 5. Trade promotions can increase social
welfare. The increase in social welfare is smaller when
the dominant retailer’s holding cost h1 is larger or b1 is
smaller (or the dominant retailer is more dominant).
The source of the welfare improvement is the fact
that price discrimination can alleviate the problem of
double marginalization in the channel, to the beneﬁt
of not only the manufacturer and the retailers but also
the consumers. Trade promotions induce the domi-
nant retailer to choose a low retail price. Although
the retail price goes up by h1/2 per period because of
the presence of the holding cost h1, the retail prices
in most periods will be lower than the benchmark
retail price ps =a 2b1 +b /4bb1, the retail price that the
dominant retailer would set if the manufacturer were
to charge all retailers the same time-invariant whole-
sale price ws = a 2b1 −b /2bb1. Interestingly, compet-
itive fringe may even beneﬁt from trade promotions
as shown above. This is because the channel proﬁt
increases as the double marginalization problem is
lessened and all channel members, including the com-
petitive fringe, can beneﬁt from increased channel
sales. Even when the competitive fringe becomes
worse off because of price discrimination, the total
social welfare can still increase because of the lower
retail price set by dominant retailer. Consequently,
trade promotions can improve channel efﬁciency and
increase social welfare.
Overall, what emerges from Proposition 1 and
Results 1–5 is a different perspective on trade pro-
motions. Manufacturers embrace trade promotions
because the practice allows them to implement price
discrimination in a distribution channel. In light of
this perspective, it is rather understandable that when
manufacturers run trade promotions, they allow for-
ward buying but disallow diversion. Our model can
also explain why retailers do not all endorse this
practice. The dominant retailer favors such a practice
because it stands to beneﬁt from trade promotions
because of its low inventory holding costs. The com-
petitive fringe could oppose such a practice because
it would become worse off because of the effective
price discrimination that trade promotions achieve.
However, this does not mean that such a practice is
harmful because social welfare can increase with this
practice. Finally, manufacturers might have incentives
to abandon this practice as the retail consolidation
continues.19
5. Extensions
Our basic model leaves the following three important
questions unanswered so far:
(1) Does price discrimination necessarily require
multiple wholesale prices, as suggested by the solu-
tion to the optimization problem (3.3)? If it does, such
a theory would be rather counterfactual because in
practice, we often observe manufacturers alternating
between two wholesale prices in a given period of
time: the regular and discounted wholesale prices.
(2) Does a price-discrimination explanation of
trade promotions also hold in the situations where
the competitive fringe has ﬁnite (as oppose to inﬁnite)
inventory holding costs?
(3) Does the price discrimination explanation of
trade promotions depend on the assumption of dom-
inant retailer channel (i.e., only the dominant retailer
has pricing power)? In other words, if the competi-
tive fringe independently and competitively sets its
retail price, would the manufacturer’s incentives to
use trade promotions to price discriminate go away?
5.1. Comparing the Two-Price Model with
the Full Model
In our basic model, as the optimal solution, the man-
ufacturer’s wholesale price increases every period,
after the initial dip, over the rest of the pricing cycle.
This feature of our solution is not necessary because
two price points are sufﬁcient for price discrimina-
tion to occur. In fact, there are three ways to recon-
cile our optimal solution with the frequently observed
trade promotion practice of two price points. First, the
parameters can be such that the optimal solution calls
for a regular wholesale price and a discounted price.
In other words, there is a possibility that a two-price
solution might indeed be optimal. Of course, such
an explanation would be, admittedly, quite tenuous,
given that our model does not offer a way to restrict
the parameter space.
19 This might well explain why the portion of trade promotion bud-
gets allocated to off-invoice allowances has decreased from about
90% in the mid-1990s to about 35% in recent years (Cannondale
Associates 2003), but chain retailers, as they become more domi-
nant through consolidation, prefer off-invoice trade promotions to
performance-based promotions such as scan-backs. Gómez et al.
(2005) ﬁnd that retailers with a larger share of private label, larger
annual sales, and stronger brand positioning do demand more
trade promotion funds to off-invoices.Cui, Raju, and Zhang: A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
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Table 5 Difference in the Manufacturer’s Proﬁt Between Multiple-Wholesale-Price Strategy and Two-Wholesale-Price Strategy (%)
Holding cost h1 (%)
b1 0.0005 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
1.00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.05 0 03 0 05 0 04 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.10 0 07 0 14 0 13 0 10 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.15 0 11 0 25 0 24 0 22 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.20 0 15 0 34 0 35 0 26 0 34 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.25 0 19 0 42 0 47 0 39 0 47 0 13 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.30 0 22 0 50 0 55 0 51 0 52 0 26 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.35 0 25 0 57 0 63 0 58 0 58 0 32 0 04 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.40 0 27 0 62 0 69 0 62 0 55 0 31 0 08 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.45 0 29 0 66 0 72 0 64 0 48 0 26 0 07 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.50 0 31 0 68 0 73 0 64 0 37 0 18 0 03 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
Second, we show that using only two price
points allows the manufacturer to price discriminate
between the dominant retailer and competitive fringe
effectively and to capture the bulk of the beneﬁts from
trade promotions. When the manufacturer is restricted
to adopt the two-wholesale-price strategy only, all
results under the multiple-wholesale-price strategy
will hold! This means that this practice can also be
justiﬁed based on the trade-off between simplicity in
administering trade promotions and proﬁt gains. As
Table 5 shows, the proﬁt that the manufacturer sacri-
ﬁces when switching from a regime of unconstrained
multiple wholesale prices to a regime of constrained
two wholesale prices is small (smaller than 1%). This
implies that even with the minimalist approach of two
price points, the manufacturer can reap substantial
beneﬁts from trade promotions.
Finally, it is assumed that price changes are costless.
In practice, cost of changing prices can be substantial,
both in terms of monetary costs and in terms of good
will (Levy et al. 1997). When such a cost is considered,
the manufacturer might want to use two price points.
5.2. Finite Inventory Holding Costs for
Both Retailers
If the competitive fringe has a ﬁnite (as opposed to
inﬁnite in the basic model) unit inventory holding
cost, but such cost is still higher than the dominant
retailer’s (i.e., 0 <h 1 <h 2 <  ), the manufacturer
can still use trade promotions to price discriminate.
The proofs are in the Technical Appendix, which can
be found at http://mktsci.pubs.informs.org. The price
discrimination comes about because of the extent to
which different retailers can take advantage of trade
promotions because of differences in holding costs.
5.3. Generalizing fromthe Dom inant
Retailer Model
Consider, for instance, an alternative demand model
given by
Q1 =a1 −b1p1 +c1p2 
Q2 =a2 −b2p2 +c2p1 
where pi is the price for retailer i (Sayman et al.
2002). In Technical Appendix A, which can be found
at http://mktsci.pubs.informs.org, we show that in
this model, the manufacturer can price discriminate
between retailers through trade promotions, even
if both retailers independently and simultaneously
make pricing decisions, as long as min b1 b 2 >
max c1 c 2 . In other words, as long as the compet-
ing retailers exhibit different price sensitivities to
the wholesale price, and the higher price-sensitivity
retailer has a lower inventory holding cost, the manu-
facturer can beneﬁt from price discrimination through
trade promotions.
6. Conclusion and Discussion
Many researchers have argued that trade promotions
are harmful to manufacturers and to the distribu-
tion channel because of the added inventory-holding
costs. Using a dominant retailer model, we show
that trade promotions can beneﬁt manufacturers and
the channel precisely because of the added inventory
cost: these costs provide the manufacturers with an
opportunity to price discriminate between a dominant
retailer and the competitive fringe. We show that the
price discriminating function of trade promotions is
not speciﬁc to the dominant retailer model and works
for other competitive models also.
What this analysis implies is that manufacturers
might want to proceed cautiously to rein in the prac-
tice of trade promotions. At the minimum, they need
to weigh the beneﬁt of price discrimination against
any possible increase in the inventory and production
costs in making such decisions.
The price discrimination perspective also sheds
some new light on the practice of trade promotions.
At a more general level, our analysis explains a few
otherwise puzzling sets of practices associated with
trade promotions: manufacturers do not seem to com-
plain about the effectiveness of trade promotions or
want to take the initiative of abandoning the prac-
tice (or when they do, they suffer); manufacturersCui, Raju, and Zhang: A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
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allow forward buying but not diversion; power retail-
ers urge for trade promotions, but small and inde-
pendent retailers frequently condemn the practice as
unfair. Our analysis shows that price discrimination
implemented through trade promotions could favor
the manufacturer and the dominant retailer at the
expense of the competitive fringe, and effective price
discrimination can be implemented if there is forward
buying but no diverting on the part of the dominant
retailer.
Our analysis also shows that price discrimination
induced through trade promotions can be welfare-
enhancing as it alleviates the problem of double
marginalization in a distribution channel. We also
show that trade promotions can increase social wel-
fare, as the difference between retailers’ holding costs
is sufﬁciently large or the dominant retailer’s market
share is sufﬁciently small (b1 is large). Surprisingly,
our analysis also ﬁnds that trade promotions might
also beneﬁt the competitive fringe under some condi-
tions. The beneﬁts to the competitive fringe come dur-
ing promotional periods, in which all retailers enjoy
the low wholesale price. Thus, when the dominant
retailer has a high holding cost h1 and a low market
share (large b1), the manufacturer will promote fre-
quently with a high promotion depth to the beneﬁt of
the competitive fringe.
Our analysis suggests that one is more likely to
observe trade promotions in industries or product cat-
egories where inventory holding cost is sufﬁciently
small, or power retailers are not too dominant. These
are testable predictions.
One could argue that trade promotions as a price
discrimination mechanism are potentially more effec-
tive and robust than other pricing mechanisms such
as quantity discounts or a menu of two-part tariffs
(Kuksov and Pazgal 2007). For instance, when a man-
ufacturer uses quantity discounts to price discrimi-
nate against small retailers, the small retailers may be
able to get together and pool their purchases to avail
themselves of a low wholesale price. They can act
similarly under a menu of two-part tariffs. However,
with trade promotions, the competitive fringe retailers
need to invest in joint warehouse facilities to be able
to take advantage of periodic price deals. Said differ-
ently, as a price discrimination mechanism, trade pro-
motions generate potentially less leakage than other
posted price mechanisms.
While we believe that our analysis has generated
some interesting new insights, it is important to point
out the limitations of our model. In our model, we do
not explicitly model product differentiation, although
a downward-sloping demand curve for the dominant
retailer does suggest some differentiation in its offer-
ings. If the retailers in the competitive fringe can
offer vertically differentiated products to customers,
we suspect that the competitive fringe will have more
power and can be more proﬁtable compared with
the current model.20 We do not consider the man-
ufacturer’s holding costs in the model. If the man-
ufacturer has to hold inventory instead of transfer-
ring all inventory to retailers and has lower inven-
tory holding costs than retailers, will trade promo-
tions still beneﬁt the channel? We suspect that trade
promotions can still be beneﬁcial, as the motivation
for and the effects of price discrimination in a chan-
nel do not go away because of a lower inventory
holding cost on the part of the manufacturer. We
also assume that the manufacturer is selling a single
product through retailers. In a multiple-product set-
ting, studies on how trade promotions on one prod-
uct affect the proﬁts of other products might generate
additional insights (Chen and Xie 2007). Finally, we
assume that the manufacturer is a monopoly in sup-
plying products to retailers (Liu and Zhang 2006). It is
important for future research to investigate whether
trade promotions could still help manufacturers to
price discriminate between retailers in a competitive
context. We suspect that they still could, because
competition rarely negates any incentive for price
discrimination.
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Appendix A. Retailers’ Incentives to
Reduce Holding Costs
Assume 0 <h 1 ≤ h2 <  . The manufacturer will offer a
wholesale price w1 in the ﬁrst period and wi in period i.
Furthermore, it will charge a w1 and choose a pricing cycle
length N such that the competitive fringe will not make
bridge buying, otherwise the manufacturer will offer a single
wholesale price ws, instead of offering a trade promotion
with both retailers making bridge buying. Intuitively, the
dominant retailer, who is making bridge buying, will have
a larger incentive to reduce unit holding cost because the
dominant retailer will reduce unit acquisition cost in each of
the N periods. The competitive fringe, who has a unit hold-
ing cost h2 >h 1 and is making forward buying for a shorter
period than N, will have a smaller incentive because it will
beneﬁt from reduced holding cost in less than N periods.
We formally prove this result below.
Dominant Retailer’s Incentives
Given w1 and N, the dominant retailer will choose a retail
price pi =  a+b1w1 +b1h1 i−1  /2b1 in period i and its
effective unit acquisition cost in period i will be equal
to w1 +  i − 1 h1,( i = 1     N). Therefore, the dominant
retailer’s proﬁt in period i is given by
 
i
d = p
i −w1 − i−1 h1  a−b1p
i   (A1)
20 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue.Cui, Raju, and Zhang: A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
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and its total proﬁt in one pricing cycle is given by
 
T
d =
N  
i=1
 
i
d =
N  
i=1
 p
i −w1 − i−1 h1  a−b1p
i   (A2)
The dominant retailer’s incentive to reduce holding cost h1
is therefore given by21
  T
d
 h1
=
N  
i=1
  i
d
 h1
=−
N  
i=1
 i−1  a−b1p
i 
=−
N  
i=1
 i−1 Qdi <0  (A3)
That is, the dominant retailer’s proﬁt will be higher as its
holding cost h1 goes down.
Competitive Fringe’s Incentives
We have stated that the retailers in the competitive fringe
are not making bridge buying as the dominant retailer is.
Otherwise, trade promotions will not be proﬁtable for
the manufacturer. However, the competitive fringe’s non-
inﬁnity unit holding cost h2 makes it probable for the
competitive fringe to make forward buying in the promo-
tional period. Let ¯ x be the number of periods in which
the competitive fringe’s effective unit acquisition cost in
period i = 1     ¯ x is lower than the retail price pi if
the competitive fringe makes forward buying in the ﬁrst
period at the wholesale price w1. That is, w1 +  ¯ x − 1  ·
h2 ≤ p¯ x and w1 +  ¯ x + 1 − 1 h2 >p ¯ x+1. Knowing the com-
petitive fringe’s effective acquisition cost, the manufac-
turer will not charge the retailers in competitive fringe a
wholesale price equal to pi in periods 1 to ¯ x, but charge
them the effective unit acquisition cost w1 +  i − 1 h2
to make competitive fringe retailers indifferent between
making forward buying and ordering from the manufac-
turer in each period. Because the effective unit acqui-
sition cost is not lower than the promotional price w1,
the manufacturer could have higher proﬁts by charg-
ing them the effective acquisition cost than announc-
ing a wholesale price equal to the retail price in period
i =1     ¯ x. Assume x makes the constraint equal
w1 + x−1 h2 =p
x =
a+b1w1 +b1h1 x−1 
2b1
  (A4)
and we get x = 1 +  a−b1w1 / b1 2h2 −h1  . Therefore, we
have
¯ x =int x =int
 
1+
a−b1w1
b1 2h2 −h1 
 
and x−1< ¯ x ≤x  (A5)
Assume there are C identical retailers in the compet-
itive fringe, each of whom has a demand proportion of
 1/C Qci =  1/C  b1 − b pi in period i = 1     N. Any
retailer’s effective unit acquisition cost of each item sold in
21 Here, we use marginal analysis in studying retailers’ incentives
to reduce unit holding cost. That is, given w1, N, and ¯ x (for com-
petitive fringe), the dominant retailer’s (any competitive fringe
retailer’s) incentive of reducing unit holding cost h1 (h2) is analyzed
here.
period i ≤ ¯ x equals ci
2 = w1 +  i − 1 h2, and the retailer’s
proﬁt in period i is given by
   
i
c = p
i −w1 − i−1 h2 ×
b1 −b
C
p
i  (A6)
The retailer’s proﬁts from period ¯ x + 1 to period N are
zero because the manufacturer will take all surplus from the
competitive fringe by charging a wholesale price slightly
lower than the market price. So the total proﬁt within a pric-
ing cycle for any retailer in competitive fringe is given by
   
T
c =
¯ x  
i=1
   
i
c =
¯ x  
i=1
 p
i −w1 − i−1 h2 ×
b1 −b
C
p
i  (A7)
The incentive for any retailer in the competitive fringe to
reduce holding cost h2 is given by
     T
c
 h2
=
¯ x  
i=1
     i
c
 h2
=−
¯ x  
i=1
 i−1 
b1 −b
C
p
i
=−
¯ x  
i=1
 i−1 
1
C
Qci <0  (A8)
That is, the competitive fringe’s proﬁt will be higher as the
holding cost h2 goes down.
Because ¯ x<N, Equations (A3) and (A8) show that the
dominant retailer has more incentives than any competi-
tive fringe to reduce holding costs if the dominant retailer’s
demand (Qdi) is not smaller than the demand of any retailer
in the competitive fringe ( 1/C Qci) in periods i = 1     ¯ x,
or
 N
i=1 i − 1  a − b1pi >
 ¯ x
i=1 i − 1   b1 −b /C pi for Qdi ≥
Qci/C. 
Appendix B. Proof of Lemmas and Proposition 1
Proof of Lemma 1. Conditional on wholesale price ws,
the dominant retailer’s proﬁt in any period is given by
 d s = ps −ws  a−b1ps   (B1)
The ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC) of the proﬁt function deter-
mines the dominant retailer’s optimal retail price, which is
given by
ps =
a+b1ws
2b1
  (B2)
and retailers’ demands are given by

   
   
Qd s =a−b1ps =
a−b1ws
2
Qc s = b1 −b ps =
 b1 −b  a+b1ws 
2b1
 
(B3)
The manufacturer chooses ws to maximize its proﬁt  s =
ws Qd s +Qc s . The optimal ws is given by
ws =
a 2b1 −b 
2bb1
  (B4)
Given ws = a 2b1 −b /2bb1, it is easy to derive other results
in the lemma. Cui, Raju, and Zhang: A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
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Proof of Lemma 2. The way to prove Lemma 2 is to
consider the dominant retailer’s decisions in an arbitrary
period based on effective unit acquisition cost. The dom-
inant retailer purchases inventory in the ﬁrst period at a
wholesale price w1 and will be charged a unit holding cost
h1 >0 per period for inventory it carries from one period to
the next. Thus the effective unit acquisition cost of the units
sold in period j = 1     N is equal to w1 + j −1 h1. Here,
w1 is the original purchase cost and  i−1 h1 is the holding
cost charged to each unit sold in period i. Therefore, the
dominant retailer’s proﬁt for period j is given by
 
j
d h1 = p
j −w1 − j −1 h1  a−b1p
j   (B5)
and it will choose a retail price pj = a+b1w1 +b1h1 j −1  /
2b1 in period j. Both the dominant retailer and the compet-
itive fringe pay the promotional wholesale price w1 in the
ﬁrst period. From the second period on, the manufacturer
will charge the competitive fringe a wholesale price equal
to the retail price to get all surplus from the competitive
fringe since the competitive fringe takes the retail price pj
as given in any period j. That is, wj = pj for j = 2     N.
The manufacturer’s average proﬁt per period in a pricing
cycle is given as follows:
 h1 =
1
N
 
w1
N  
i=1
 a−b1p
i +w1 b1 −b p
1 +
N  
j=2
wj b1 −b p
j
 
 
(B6)
where
 N
i=1 a−b1pi  is the dominant retailer’s total ordering
quantity, pi =  a+b1w1 +b1h1 i−1  /2b1 is the retail price
in period i, and wj = pj is the wholesale price in period
j = 2     N. Because  h1 is strictly concave in w1, FOC
solves w1 as follows:
w1 =
N 4ab1 −2ab −bb1h1 N −1  
2b1 b N +1 +b1 N −1  
  (B7)
Other results in Lemma 2 can then be easily derived. 
Proof of Proposition 1. If 0 ≤ h1 <h 2 =  , the manu-
facturer will offer wholesale prices w1 and wi (i =2     N)
as in Equation (3.1). For items sold in the promotional
period, both the dominant retailer and competitive fringe
are having the same unit acquisition cost w1. For items
sold in period i =2     N, the unit acquisition cost for the
dominant retailer is equal to w1 + h1 i − 1  and the cost
for the competitive fringe is equal to the wholesale price
in that period wi =  a+b1w1 +b1h1 i−1  /2b1. We have
wi− w1+h1 i−1  = a−b1 w1 +h1 i−1   /2b1 = a−b1pi /
b1 > 0. Therefore, the competitive fringe is paying a higher
average unit acquisition cost in a pricing cycle than the
dominant retailer. If 0 ≤ h1 <h 2 <  , the same logic still
applies as long as the optimal pricing cycle length is N ≥2.
The only difference is that it is possible that the retailers in
the competitive fringe would also like to carry some inven-
tory from one period to the next, but they will carry items
for fewer periods than the dominant retailer because of their
higher inventory holding cost. If they are carrying items for
the same periods as the dominant retailer, trade promotions
will not be worthy of the manufacturer and the optimal N
will be equal to 1, i.e., no trade promotions are offered. 
Appendix C. Credibility of Manufacturer’s
Announcement of N and wi  i =1     N 
In this section, we will show that the manufacturer’s
announcements of both the length of pricing cycle N and
the wholesale price wi for each period i within a pric-
ing cycle consisting of N periods (i = 1     N) are credi-
ble. That is, given the announced N and wi (i = 1     N)
determined as in Lemma 2, the manufacturer will not have
incentives to deviate from them. The intuition is as fol-
lows. Given the preannounced optimal N, the manufac-
turer will not have incentive to extend N to any   N>N.
The reason for the manufacturer to run trade promotions
is that trade promotions will provide a higher average
proﬁt per pricing cycle for the manufacturer than a time-
invariant wholesale price. If a manufacturer deviates from
N to   N>Nand charges the optimal time-invariant whole-
sale price ws as shown in Lemma 1 for periods N +1        N
(the dominant retailer’s inventory ordered in period 1 will
be depleted in period N), the manufacturer will get a lower
average proﬁt per period for periods N + 1        N. Given
the preannounced N, the manufacturer will have no incen-
tive to deviate to any   N<Neither. In a pricing cycle, the
manufacturer gets a much lower proﬁt from units sold in
period 1 than the average proﬁt per period in the pric-
ing cycle since the wholesale price w1 is low and avail-
able to both the dominant retailer and competitive fringe.
In each period i (i =2     N), however, the manufacturer
will get a higher than average proﬁt from units sold in
the period. The higher than average proﬁt comes from the
manufacturer’s complete gain of competitive fringe’s sur-
plus by charging a wholesale price equal to retail price in
each period. If the manufacturer deviates to any   N<N ,i t
will get a lower average proﬁt per period for each pricing
cycle since the manufacturer is cutting off the high proﬁt
periods   N +1     N, while the dominant retailer will bring
unsold units (because of the truncation of the pricing cycle)
to the next pricing cycle. The manufacturer will thus have
no incentive to either extend or shorten a pricing cycle from
N to any   N>Nor   N<N . In any period i =2     N, the
manufacturer will have no incentive to deviate from the pre-
announced wi either. Because wi =pi for i = 2     N, the
manufacturer will not increase the wholesale price because
such an increase will let the manufacturer lose the proﬁt
from competitive fringe by making the wholesale price for
the competitive fringe higher than the retail price. The man-
ufacturer will also have no incentive to decrease whole-
sale price. If the reduced wholesale price in any period
i = 2     N (denoted as   wi) is so low that the dominant
retailer ﬁnds it proﬁtable to make an order, it is equiva-
lent to the case where the manufacturer starts a new pricing
cycle (equivalently, chooses an   N<N), which is not optimal
for the manufacturer as shown above. If the reduced whole-
sale price is not low enough to induce the dominant retailer
to order in period i = 2     N, the manufacturer will lose
a margin of wi −   wi from competitive fringe, which is also
not optimal. Either way, the manufacturer will not get a
higher proﬁt by deviating from the preannounced wi. Thus,
the manufacturer will not deviate from the preannounced
N and wi  i =1     N .
Now, we will proceed the proof in the following steps.
First, we will show that the manufacturer will not have
incentives to deviate from the optimal N. Second, we willCui, Raju, and Zhang: A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
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show that the manufacturer will not have incentives to devi-
ate from wholesale price wi for each period i within a pric-
ing cycle consisting of N periods (i = 1     N), given the
dominant retailer’s order in the ﬁrst period Q1
d =
 N
i=1Qdi =
 N/4  2 a−b1w1 −b1h1 N −1  .
No Deviation from N
Given both dominant retailer’s and competitive fringe’s
decisions in Lemma 2, the manufacturer will not increase
the length of pricing cycle from the optimal N to any   N
for N<  N<2N.22 Suppose the manufacturer changes the
length of pricing cycle from N to   N after the dominant
retailer makes its order in the ﬁrst period
Q
1
d = N/4  2 a−b1w1 −b1h1 N −1   
It is then optimal for the manufacturer to set a whole-
sale price at ws = a 2b1 −b /2bb1 for each period j (j =
N + 1 N + 2        N) and gets an average proﬁt per
period of  s = a2 2b1 −b 2/8bb2
1 for periods N + 1 
N +2        N if trade promotions are not used between peri-
ods N +1 and   N.23 Because the reason for the manufacturer
to provide trade promotions is that trade promotions will
provide a higher average proﬁt to the manufacturer than
a common time-invariant wholesale price to retailers, it is
not optimal for the manufacturer to deviate from N to any
  N>N . Now, let’s show that the manufacturer also has no
incentives to shorten N to any   N<N. To prove so, we need
the following lemma, which shows that the manufacturer’s
proﬁt from sales in period N is the smallest among periods
2     N.
Lemma 3. In a pricing cycle, the manufacturer’s proﬁt from
sales in a period is the minimum in period j =min N  bb1w1 −
 b1 −b  a−b1h1  / b1h1 b1 −b    among periods 2     N.
Proof of Lemma 3. The sales in any period j =2     N
consists of two parts—sales of the items the dominant
retailer orders in period 1 at a wholesale price w1 and car-
ries to period j, and sales of the items the ﬁrms in competi-
tive fringe order from the manufacturer at a wholesale price
wj and sell in period j. The sales in period j is equal to Qj =
a − bpj =  2ab1 −ab −bb1w1 −bb1h1 j −1  /2b1 as shown in
Lemma 2. Manufacturer’s proﬁt from the sales in period
j =2     N is thus given by
 
j
h1 = w1Qdj +wjQcj
=
w1 a−b1w1 −b1h1 j −1  
2
+
 b1 −b  a+b1w1 +b1h1 j −1  2
4b2
1
  (C1)
22 If   N ≥2N, then the focal periods we focus on will be from period
iN · N to period   N, where iN = int    N/N . We will then get similar
insights as in the case, where N<  N<2N.
23 An alternative way is for the manufacturer to use trade promo-
tions to price discriminate between retailers between periods N +1
and   N, but such a shorter pricing cycle will be suboptimal com-
pared with the optimal pricing cycle with a length of N because
the optimal N is determined such that it proﬁt dominates any other
length of pricing cycle (see Problem (3.3)).
The derivatives of  
j
h1 with respect to j are given by

     
     
d 
j
h1
dj
=
h1 a b1 −b +b1h1 b1 −b  N −1 −bb1w1 
2b1
d2 
j
h1
dj 2 =
h2
1 b1 −b 
2
>0 
(C2)
Because the twice derivative of  
j
h1 with respect to j is pos-
itive,  
j
h1 is strictly convex in j. Therefore, the manufac-
turer’s proﬁt  
j
h1 from sales is the minimum in period j =
min N  bb1w1 −  b1 − b  a − b1h1  / b1h1 b1 − b    among
periods 2     N, where  bb1w1 −  b1 − b  a − b1h1  /
 b1h1 b1 −b   is solved from the FOC of  
j
h1. 
When the manufacturer offers trade promotions in
period 1, the promotional wholesale price w1 is the same for
both the dominant retailer and competitive fringe, and w1
is different from the optimal constant wholesale price ws.
Thus, the manufacturer’s proﬁt from sales in period 1 is
smaller than the average proﬁt under constant wholesale
price  s = a2 2b1 −b 2/8bb2
1. The reason for the manufac-
turer to offer trade promotions in the current model is
because of a higher average proﬁt in a pricing cycle than  s;
thus, the manufacturer’s proﬁt from items sold in period 1
is smaller than the average proﬁt in a pricing cycle. Start-
ing from period 2, the manufacturer will have to get a
higher proﬁt from the items sold in each period than the
average proﬁt to compensate the proﬁt loss in period 1. The
higher-than-average proﬁt in each period comes from sales
to competitive fringe at a wholesale price of wi = pi. Such
a compensation process continues until a period when the
proﬁt from that period is no longer contributable to improv-
ing the average proﬁt per period in a pricing cycle, i.e.,
the average proﬁt in that period is smaller than the aver-
age proﬁt in a pricing cycle.24  25 Thus the manufacturer will
have no incentive to cut at any period i for 2<i<Nbecause
such a cutting will let the manufacturer lose the high mar-
gin in period i associated with the order from competitive
fringe, and at the same time, orders from the dominant
retailer will not increase because any orders unsold because
of the cutting will not be absorbed by the dominant retailer
but will be carried over to and sold in the new pricing cycle.
This will generate a smaller average proﬁt per period in a
pricing cycle.
Table C.1 shows, numerically, that the manufacturer’s
proﬁt in period
min N  bb1w1 − b1 −b  a−b1h1  / b1h1 b1 −b   
is always larger than its average proﬁt per period in the
pricing cycle when the manufacturer chooses to offer trade
24 Numerical study shows that within the wide parametric ranges
d 
j
h1/dj is negative for j = N. That is, the manufacturer’s aver-
age proﬁt in each period among periods 2     N is decreasing in
j for the studied parametric values.
25 The manufacturer’s proﬁt from items sold in period i by both
retailers instead of its proﬁt from items sold in period i by compet-
itive fringe should be considered only here. This is because if the
manufacturer truncates a pricing cycle at period i, then the items
that could have been sold by the dominant retailer in period i will
be carried over to the new pricing cycle in an inﬁnitely repeated
game.Cui, Raju, and Zhang: A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
794 Marketing Science 27(5), pp. 779–795, ©2008 INFORMS
Table C.1 Comparison of the Manufacturer’s Proﬁt in Period min N  bb1w1 − b1 −b  a−b1h1  / b1h1 b1 −b    and Average Proﬁt
Holding cost h1 (%)
b1 0.0005 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
1.00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.05 0 03 0 20 0 27 1 23 0 42 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.10 0 04 0 41 0 19 0 26 2 39 1 74 1 08 0 42 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.15 0 03 0 31 0 89 1 20 0 12 2 92 2 38 1 83 1 30 0 76 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.20 0 04 0 14 0 29 1 73 0 82 3 50 3 05 2 59 2 15 1 70 1 26 0 83 0 00 0 00
1.25 0 03 0 35 0 57 0 34 1 22 0 48 3 30 2 92 2 55 2 18 1 81 1 45 1 10 0 00
1.30 0 00 0 12 0 06 0 59 1 41 0 79 3 28 2 95 2 64 2 33 2 02 1 73 1 44 0 00
1.35 0 01 0 22 0 20 0 71 1 45 0 93 0 45 2 78 2 51 2 25 2 00 1 76 1 53 0 00
1.40 0 01 0 02 0 28 0 76 1 39 0 96 0 57 2 45 2 23 2 01 1 81 1 61 0 00 0 00
1.45 0 01 0 08 0 32 0 74 0 23 0 91 0 60 2 02 1 83 1 66 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
1.50 0 02 0 11 0 33 0 11 0 27 0 79 0 55 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
promotions to retailers. Therefore, the manufacturer has
no incentive to truncate any pricing cycle into a pric-
ing cycle with a length of   N<N because the period
min N  bb1w1 − b1 −b  a−b1h1  / b1h1 b1 −b    with the
lowest average proﬁt among periods 2     N has a higher-
than-average proﬁt. That is, the announcement of optimal N
is credible and self-enforcing—the manufacturer will not
deviate to any   N>Nor   N<Nin any period i = 2     N
within a pricing cycle.
No Deviation from wi
In this subsection, we will show that the manufacturer will
not deviate from preannounced wholesale price wi in any
period within a pricing cycle.
With the announced sequence of wholesale prices wi
(i = 1     N), the manufacturer will charge the lowest
wholesale price in period 1 to induce the dominant retailer
to make forward buying. From period 2 until period N, the
manufacturer will charge a wholesale price equal to retail
price in each period to take full surplus from competitive
fringe. In any period i =2     N, the manufacturer will not
increase the wholesale price wi to any larger price because
such an increase will make the wholesale price higher than
the retail price, and thus the manufacturer will lose sales
from competitive fringe. The margin with the dominant
retailer, at the same time, does not improve because there
are no sales to the dominant retailer in any period except
in period 1 in a pricing cycle.
The manufacturer will also have no incentive to lower
the wholesale price wi in any period i = 2     N. Suppose
the manufacturer sets a wholesale price   wi <w i in period i.
There will be one of the following two consequences. In
the ﬁrst, the new wholesale price is not low enough, so the
dominant retailer will keep selling inventory carried over
from period 1, i.e.,   wi ≥ w1 +h1 i−1 . Such a decrease will
then only decrease the manufacturer’s proﬁt because the
margin the manufacturer gets from orders from competitive
fringe is smaller, while sales do not change at all. In the sec-
ond consequence, the new wholesale price makes it more
proﬁtable for the dominant retailer to order from the man-
ufacturer in period i, i.e.,   wi <w 1 +h1 i−1 . This is essen-
tially the same as the case where the manufacturer restarts
a new pricing cycle. As shown above that it is not opti-
mal for the manufacturer to deviate from the preannounced
N to any   N<N , the manufacturer will not decrease the
wholesale price from wi to any   wi <w 1 +h1 i−1  in period
i =2     N.
Therefore, the manufacturer’s announcements of both the
length of pricing cycle N and the sequence of wholesale
prices wi, i =1     N, are credible and self-enforcing. 
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